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Case No. 7718 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE ST~-\TE OF UTAH 
In the ~latter of the Estate of 
LUCILLE LA YELLE, 
Deceased. 
ERIC W. IM~IERTHAL, 
~-\ppellant, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., Administrator, and 
JfARIE DODGE, 
Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Lucille Lavelle, sometimes known as Lucille Fields 
Lavelle, died at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the lOth day of 
July, 1950. At the time of her death she was a resident 
of Ogden, Weber County, Utah, of the approximate age 
of sixty years. 
On April 29, 1944, Lucille Lavelle made a Will, in 
which she left her estate to her half-sister, Kathleen 
Miller, and her husband John P. Lavelle, with the entire 
estate to her half-sister if she survived her husband, 
which the half-sister did. To that Will a codicil was 
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made on the 8th day of October, 1947. The Will itself 
was later mutilated and torn by the testatrix. 
On July 28,1948, Lucille Lavelle made a second Will, 
in which she revoked all former Wills and Codicils, and 
left her estate to a cousin, Marie Dodge, to a niece of her 
then deceased husband, Genevieve Barry, to Eugene 
Barry, a nephew of her deceased husband, to Esther 
Sweeney, to Cora Nixon, to Helen Horner, to William 
Hack, to Anna Barry, a sister of her deceased husband. 
In that Will she specifically disinherited her half-sister 
Kathleen Miller. 
On the 21st day of July, 1949, Lucille Lavelle made a 
third Will, in which she revoked all prior Wills and 
Codicils, and left her estate to her "very good friend 
and benefactor Eric W. Immerthal'' and to her ''devoted 
friend and benefactor Monte G. Hogg.'' The trial court 
found: 
"That at the time of the execution of said document, 
the said Lucille Lavelle was of testamentary capaci-
ty, but that the execution of said document was in-
duced by undue influence upon her of the said Eric 
W. Immerthal and Monte G. Hogg, as hereinafter 
set out." 
Then follow purported findings of fact to which Appel-
lant Eric W. Immerthal filed objections, which were by 
the court overruled. 
The Court's judgment denied admission to probate 
of the 1944 Will; admitted to probate the 1948 Will; and 
denied admission to probate of the 1949 Will. 
The proponent of the 1944 Will was Kathleen Miller. 
The proponent of the 1948 Will was Marie Dodge. The 
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proponent of the 1949 vVill was Eric W. Immerthal. 
Each of the proponents contested the other two Wills. 
The three-way \Yill contest was tried to the Court without 
a jury. 
The principal is~:me, therefore, on this appeal is the 
Court's finding of undue influence with respect to the 
third and last will and testmnent of Lucille Lavelle. 
After the judgment of the Court, admitting the 1948 
\Yill to probate, ~\.ppellant filed a motion for new trial 
or, in the alternative, a motion to open the judgment and 
take additional testimony, based in part on affidavits 
relating to newly discovered evidence. The motions were 
denied. 
Appellant, Eric W. Immerthal, was and is a male 
nurse employed by the Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hos-
pital at Ogden, Utah, and employed by private patients 
outside of the hospital. He was employed by, and at-
tended, Lucille Lavelle over a long period of time. 
:Monte Hogg was a carpenter who lived across the 
street from Lucille Lavelle, who came to do some work 
for her, and later moved into the house. He and Lucille 
Lavelle became enamoured of each other, and planned to 
marry when her health improved. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS 1, 2 and 3. 
Aside from the foregoing basic facts, the record of 
some 701 pages is replete with a myriad of details. But 
there is not a shred of evidence relating to undue influ-
ence on the part of Eric W. Immerthal or Monte G. Hogg 
relating to the execution of the third and last Will and 
rrP~tament of Lucille Lavelle. On this point we challenge 
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the record. 
All the witnesses agreed, and the evidence is un-
disputed, that Lucille Lavelle was unusually strong-mind-
ed, and mentally capable of handling her own business 
affairs. In fact the Court found that Lucille Lavelle was 
Inentally competent to make the 1949 Will at the time it 
was executed, and found that it was ''in writing, signed 
by the decedent and duly attested in accordance with law 
by two subscribing witnesses * * * that it was prepared 
by an attorney * * *and that at the time of the execution 
of said document, the said Lucille Lavelle was of testa-
mentary capacity." (pp. 5 and 6 of Findings of Fact.) 
The Court went on to find that the execution of the 
document (the 1949 Will) was "induced by undue in-
fluence upon her of the said Eric W. Immerthal and 
Monte G. Hogg * * "''''. 
The Will was 1nade in the Dee Hospital at Ogden, 
Utah. The only persons present at that time, other than 
the testatrix herself, were the two subscribing witnesses 
and the attorney who drew the Will. The Will had been 
drafted first and taken to her for her approval. She 
instructed its re-drafting. It was re-drafted and brought 
back for execution and executed. (Tr. 43, 45, 56) 
Neither Eric W. Immerthal nor Monte G. Hogg were 
anywhere around when the Will was executed or when 
it was drafted. 
The contestants relied upon the fact that both Im-
merthal and Hogg had opportunity to influence her. But 
we submit that the law requires more than mere oppor-
tunity; and that the burden of proof is upon the con-
testant to prove the undue influence. 
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~aid the Utah 8uprmne Court in the case of In re 
Bryan·~ Estate, 25 p. (2) 602, 82 Utah 390, at page 610: 
··The Inere existence of undue influence, or an 
opportunity to exercise it, is not sufficient; such 
influence Inust be actually exerted on the mind of 
the testator in regard to the execution of the Will 
in question, either at the time of the execution of 
the \Yill or so near thereto as to be still operative, 
with the object of procuring a Will in favor of par-
ticular parties, and it must result in the making of 
testamentary dispositions which the testator would 
not otherwise have Inade. '' 
See also: In Re McCoy's Estate, 63 Pacific (2) 620, 
91 rtah 212; 
In Re Hanson's Estate, 52 P. (2) 1103, 87 Utah 580; 
In Re Finkler's Estate, 46 P. (2) 149, 7 Cal. 2d 97; 
In Re Hansen's Estate, 167 P. 256, 50 Utah 207; 
In Re Ford's Estate, 261 P. 15, 70 Utah 456. 
As indicated above, the testamony of all the wit-
nesses who were asked about her mentality were in 
harmony as to her strength of will and her strong-nrind-
edness. Concerning such a mentality and undue in-
fluence the Utah Supreme Court in the case of In re 
Bryan's Estate, supra, went on to say: 
"No precise quantity of influence can be said 
to be necessary and sufficient in all cases, as the 
amount necessarily varies with the circumstances 
of each case, and especially does it vary accordingly 
as the strength or weakness of mind of each testator 
varies, the amount of influence necessary to domi-
nate a mind impaired by age, disease, or dissipation 
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being obviously less than that required to control a 
strong mind. 
''Another case of similar import is Martin v. 
Bowdern, 158 Mo. 379, 59 S.W. 227, 231 * * * the 
Supreme Court said: 'Undue influence means such 
influence as amounts to over persuasion, coercion, 
or force, destroying the free agency and will power 
of testator.' " 
POINT 4. 
At the conclusion of the trial and before the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed by counsel for 
Marie Dodge were signed by the Court, Appellant filed 
Objections thereto. 
It would serve no point here to re-state them as they 
are a part of the record on this appeal. A careful reading 
of the transcript will show that the objections were well 
taken, and that the Court's Findings of Fact were not 
supported by the testimony. Particular attention is in-
vited to paragraph designated 12 on page 5 of Appel-
lant's objections, which is a summary of Appellant's 
contention with respect to the then proposed Findings 
of Fact, in the light of the cases cited above. 
POINT f>. 
Appellant is perplexed at the trail court's decision, 
in view of the testimony and in the light of the dt>{'ided 
cases. Believing that the court may have been influenced 
by certain of the testimony subsequent to the making of 
the last will and testament of decendent on .July :21st, 
1949, and prior to decedent's death, Appellant offered 
affidavidt 's with respect to evidence discovered after 
the trial, which confirmed Appellant's contention that 
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Lucille Lavelle not only made the kind of testamentary 
disposition she wanted to make in the 1949 Will, but 
that she confirmed those testamentary dispositions from 
time to time over a period of several months prior to her 
death. 
Our view of the court's thinking in this respect is 
borne out by paragraph 1± of the court's Findings of 
Fact. While we thought that was error, in the light 
of the cases, we nevertheless offered the newly discovered 
evidence to establish the facts: (1) that Lucille Lavelle 
did have visitors in the Salt Lake rest horne; (2) that 
Hogg did not visit here there at any time; (3) that Eric 
W. Irnrnerthal visited her only a few times in several 
months, and was never alone with her; ( 4) and that she 
had ample opportunity and the mental capacity to change 
her last will and testament (1949); (5) but that she not 
only did not do so, but repeatedly confirmed it. 
Reference is hereby made to the affidavits in sup-
port of Appellant's motion for new trial or motion to 
open the judgment and take additional testimony, which 
was made pursuant to Rule 59-a of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
We submit that if the Court's Findings in paragraph 
14 have probative value, then Appellant's motion should 
have been granted and it was error to deny that motion. 
If no probative value, then the court's Findings in that 
respect were in error. 
CONCLUSION 
We, therefore, submit that the judgment of the lower 
court should be set aside, and the last will and testament 
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of the decedent Lucille Lavelle, dated July 21, 1949, 
should he ordered admitted to probate. 
Respectfully submitted, 
8 
LEWIS J. WALLACE 
M. BLAINE PETERSON 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
